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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
BECKER, Chief Judge. 
 
These are consolidated appeals from the grant of 
summary judgment in favor of the defendants in a two- 
tiered legal malpractice action governed by New Jersey law. 
The seeds of this case were sown in the early 1980s when 
Plaintiff Dixon Ticonderoga Company (Dixon) sold a piece of 
industrial property to a company named the Dixon Venture 
(Venture). Defendant William O'Connor--who was affiliated 
with Defendant Schumann Hanlon & Panepinto (the 
Schumann firm)--represented Dixon in connection with the 
sale. Between the time Dixon agreed to sell the property to 
Venture and the time the sale closed, the New Jersey 
Legislature enacted the Environmental Cleanup 
Responsibility Act (ECRA), which imposed substantial new 
clean-up responsibilities on owners of industrial property 
that wished to sell their land. 
 
In the first tier of this action, Dixon char ges that 
O'Connor committed malpractice by failing to advise it 
about ECRA, and submits that his failure r esulted in its 
transaction with Venture being subject to ECRA. Dixon did 
not comply with ECRA prior to transferring ownership of 
the property to Venture, and V enture sued Dixon to recover 
clean-up costs that it was forced to incur in connection 
with the sale. Though a trial court originally dismissed 
Venture's suit, the appellate courts r einstated it, and 
Venture ultimately obtained a substantial judgment against 
Dixon. Dixon claims that this judgment was the dir ect 
result of O'Connor's negligence. 
 
The second tier of this case involves Dixon's legal 
malpractice claims against Defendant Harold Friedman, 
who during all relevant times was affiliated with Defendant 
Franzblau Dratch. Friedman represented Dixon during 
much of the litigation brought against it by V enture. In 
1989, Friedman spoke with Dixon's outside counsel about 
the possibility of suing O'Connor for malpractice. Dixon 
submits that this conversation created an attor ney-client 
relationship between it and Friedman with r espect to a 
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potential malpractice claim against O'Connor , and alleges 
that Friedman breached his professional duties to it by 
allowing that claim to become time-barred. 
 
Dixon filed the instant suit against O'Connor , the 
Schumann firm, Friedman, and Franzblau Dratch in 1996. 
Soon thereafter, O'Connor and the Schumann firm moved 
to have the claims against them dismissed pursuant to 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) as time-barred. 
Though Friedman and Franzblau Dratch opposed this 
motion, it was granted by the District Court. Friedman and 
Franzblau Dratch appeal from this aspect of the District 
Court's judgment. Later, the District Court granted 
summary judgment in favor of Friedman and Franzblau 
Dratch. The court held that, even assuming that he created 
an attorney-client relationship between himself and Dixon 
with respect to a potential malpractice action against 
O'Connor, Friedman had breached no pr ofessional duty 
that he owed to Dixon. Dixon appeals from this portion of 
the judgment. 
 
To resolve both tiers of this appeal we must first decide 
when Dixon gained and lost the right to sue O'Connor for 
malpractice. Under New Jersey law, the time for bringing a 
legal malpractice claim expires six years after the claim 
accrued. As we will explain, accrual occurs when a 
prospective plaintiff gains knowledge of two elements: (1) 
that his or her lawyer has been at fault; and (2) that he or 
she has been injured due to the lawyer's err or. Because 
O'Connor's alleged fault in this case lies in his failure to 
inform Dixon about ECRA prior to the closing of the 
Venture deal, we conclude that the first element was 
satisfied in either late 1984 or early 1985, when Dixon 
learned that ECRA had applied to the transaction. We 
further determine that Dixon was damaged by O'Connor's 
purported error by October 21, 1985, when Dixon incurred 
attorneys' fees in responding to V enture's demands that it 
comply with ECRA. 
 
In so concluding, we reject several arguments offered by 
Friedman and Franzblau Dratch in favor of a later accrual 
date. Friedman submits that the limitations period did not 
commence until the New Jersey appellate courts first 
issued a ruling adverse to Dixon in the suit br ought against 
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Dixon by Venture. We disagr ee, both because the Supreme 
Court of New Jersey has rejected per se rules in this 
context, and because we believe that the necessary 
prerequisites for accrual were satisfied long before that 
time. Franzblau Dratch submits that the statute did not 
begin to run until Venture first sued Dixon, and that the 
limitations period was tolled between the time that the trial 
court threw out the Venture litigation and the time that the 
appellate courts reinstated it. Based on these premises, 
Franzblau Dratch contends that the statute of limitations 
did not run on Dixon's claim against O'Connor until after 
Friedman left Franzblau Dratch, and it submits that it 
cannot be held liable as a result. We r eject this submission 
because: (1) it is ultimately irrelevant due to our 
disagreement with Franzblau Dratch as to when Dixon's 
claim against O'Connor accrued; (2) the tolling ar gument 
rests on a mistaken view of what O'Connor is alleged to 
have done wrong; and (3) the tolling ar gument is 
inconsistent with the policies behind New Jersey's statute 
of limitations and is unsupported by any relevant New 
Jersey case law. We therefore hold that Dixon's claims 
against O'Connor and the Schumann firm accrued by 
October 21, 1985 and that the limitations period on those 
claims ran by October 21, 1991. Because the instant suit 
was not filed until 1996, we will affirm the portion of the 
District Court's judgment that dismissed the claims against 
O'Connor and the Schumann firm. 
 
We will, however, reverse the portion of the District 
Court's judgment that granted summary judgment in favor 
of Friedman and Franzblau Dratch because we conclude 
that there are genuine issues of material fact that preclude 
us from determining whether the 1989 conversation 
between Friedman and Dixon's outside counsel cr eated an 
attorney-client relationship with r egard to a potential 
malpractice action against O'Connor, and, assuming that it 
did, whether Friedman committed malpractice. Accor ding to 
the Restatement of Law Governing Lawyers, whose 
standards the parties agree govern this case, an attorney- 
client relationship is created with r espect to a given matter 
when: (1) a person informs a lawyer that he or she wants 
the lawyer to provide legal services with r espect to a given 
matter; (2) the lawyer does not refuse; and (3) the lawyer 
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knows or should know that the person reasonably relies on 
the lawyer to provide such services. 
 
The existence of the first factor is essentially conceded. 
We conclude that there is a genuine issue of fact going to 
the second element, because our review of the r elevant 
deposition transcripts indicates that there is at least a 
conflict as to whether Friedman ever refused to undertake 
the representation. Finally, there is a genuine issue as to 
whether the third factor is satisfied because: (1) Friedman 
and Dixon had a preexisting (and ongoing) r elationship 
involving a related matter; (2) Friedman admitted that he 
gave Dixon legal advice about suing O'Connor in 1989; and 
(3) a reasonable reading of the deposition transcripts 
supports an inference that during the 1989 conversation 
Friedman promised to discuss the matter with Dixon again 
at a later date. Although two letters that Dixon's outside 
counsel wrote to Friedman in 1992 could be r ead as 
suggesting that Dixon was not relying on Friedman to 
provide it with legal advice regar ding a malpractice action 
against O'Connor, we do not believe that they so establish 
as a matter of law. 
 
If the 1989 conversation created an attor ney-client 
relationship, we also believe that ther e is a genuine dispute 
as to whether Friedman committed malpractice. A lawyer 
who assumes a representation must exer cise reasonable 
and ordinary care over the matters entrusted to him or her. 
Because the undisputed evidence establishes that 
Friedman did nothing at all between the 1989 conversation 
and the running of the statute of limitations in 1991, we 
conclude that there is a genuine issue as to whether he 






As generations of children and standardized test-takers 
know, Dixon makes pencils.1 For over a hundred years, it 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Appellant Dixon Ticonderoga Company was created by a September 
1983 merger of the Bryn Mawr Corporation and the Joseph Dixon 
Crucible Company. 
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owned a 36-building industrial facility in Jersey City, New 
Jersey (the Jersey City property). The events underlying 
this appeal began to take shape in 1982 when Dixon 
decided to sell the Jersey City property, and r etained 
attorney O'Connor to advise it regar ding the sale. 
 
On April 28, 1983, Dixon agreed to sell the Jersey City 
property to Morris Industrial Builders, which immediately 
assigned its rights to Venture. Under the contract, Venture 
was to lease several of the buildings back to Dixon for a 
period of two years following the sale; we will r efer to this 
as the "lease-back." The contract also contained an "as is" 
clause, stating that Venture was acquiring the property 
"without any representations as to[the] character or quality 
[of the property] except as expressly provided herein." 
Closing was made contingent upon Ventur e's obtaining a 
zoning variance; the contract provided that closing would 
occur within 60 days of it doing so. 
 
Though the variance seems to have been obtained on 
October 12, 1983, the sale was not closed within 60 days 
of that time. Instead, on October 31, a lawyer for V enture 
wrote to O'Connor in his capacity as Dixon's counsel. The 
letter represented (falsely, it seems) that the variance had 
not yet gone through, and purported to extend the time for 
closing as provided in the contract. O'Connor did not 
question the basis for the extension, nor did he pr ess for an 
immediate closing. On January 27, 1984, however , 
O'Connor wrote to Venture, noting that the contractually- 
required conditions had occurred and accusing Venture of 
"delaying this closing for reasons which ar e not the concern 
of Dixon." O'Connor sent another letter on February 7, 
fixing February 24 as the "time of the essence" date for the 
closing. The transaction eventually closed on that date. 
 
Unbeknownst to Dixon and Venture, a significant 
development had occurred between the time they entered 
into the contract on April 28, 1983 and the time the deal 
closed on February 24, 1984. In September 1983, the New 
Jersey Legislature enacted ECRA, which imposed 
significant new clean-up responsibilities on owners of 
industrial facilities that wished to transfer their property.2 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. In 1993, ECRA was renamed the "Industrial Site Recovery Act." See 
N.J. Stat. Ann. S 13:1K-6. 
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The new rules, however, were made applicable only to 
transfers occurring after December 31, 1983. See N.J. Stat. 
Ann. S 13:1K-6 (Historical & Statutory Notes; Effective 
Date). Though "[t]he passage of ECRA was no secret to the 
legal community," neither O'Connor nor counsel for 
Venture advised either party about ECRA prior to the 
closing. As a result, the parties made no ef fort to close 
before the statute's effective date or to deal with its 
requirements in their agreement. Dixon did not clean up 
the Jersey City property as requir ed by ECRA before 
transferring ownership to Venture. Repr esentatives of both 
Dixon and Venture have subsequently stated that they 
would have attempted to structure their transaction to 
avoid ECRA applicability had they known about the statute. 
 
Although neither Dixon nor Venture was aware of ECRA 
when they closed, Dixon soon realized its mistake. Dixon's 
sale of the Jersey City property had been part of a 
corporate-wide process of moving its operations to Florida. 
This process also included the selling of its corporate 
headquarters, which at that time was also located in Jersey 
City. Dixon retained Friedman to assist in this latter sale, 
which included getting a letter from New Jersey's 
Department of Environmental Protection stating that the 
transaction did not implicate ECRA. In the course of 
carrying out these responsibilities, Friedman became aware 
of Dixon's sale of its Jersey City property, and realized that 
the closing date had rendered that transaction subject to 
ECRA. Sometime in either late 1984 or early 1985, 
Friedman spoke with the man who had served as Dixon's 
chief negotiator in the sale of the Jersey City pr operty, and 
informed him that ECRA had applied to that sale. 
 
Venture also realized that the closing date on the sale of 
the Jersey City property had render ed the transaction 
subject to ECRA. On July 15, 1985, it sent a letter 
demanding that Dixon comply with ECRA in connection 
with the impending termination of the lease-back. On 
October 9, 1985, Venture again wr ote to Dixon, noting that 
the sale's closing date had rendered it subject to ECRA. The 
second letter was addressed to Friedman as Dixon's 
counsel, and Friedman directed an associate to draft a 
response on behalf of Dixon. Friedman's fir m sent a letter 
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to Venture on October 21, 1985. Friedman stated that he 
assumed that he billed Dixon for these services. 
 
Venture was eventually forced to engage in an extensive 
environmental clean-up of the Jersey City pr operty, and on 
May 27, 1986 it sued Dixon in the Superior Court of New 
Jersey to recover those costs. We will r efer to this as the 
"Venture litigation" (or "action" or "suit"). Venture raised 
claims under ECRA and another New Jersey envir onmental 
statute, as well as various common law theories. Though 
Friedman did not originally represent Dixon in the Venture 
action, he was retained to do so in November 1987. The 
Superior Court granted summary judgment in favor of 
Dixon on February 18, 1988, holding, inter alia , that the 
sole remedy for a non-conforming sale under ECRA was 
rescission and recovery of affiliated costs. This decision, 
however, was reversed by the Appellate Division, which on 
July 21, 1989 held that ECRA permits a transferee (like 
Venture) to sue a transferor (like Dixon) for damages arising 
from a non-conforming sale. See Dixon Venture v. Joseph 
Dixon Crucible Co., 561 A.2d 663 (N.J. App. Div. 1989). 
Dixon appealed. 
 
Shortly after the Appellate Division decision in 1989, 
Friedman spoke with Dixon's outside counsel, Richar d 
Joyce. At that time, Joyce raised the possibility of suing 
O'Connor for malpractice, based on the latter's failure to 
advise Dixon about ECRA prior to the sale of the Jersey 
City property. In their depositions, Friedman and Joyce 
offered largely consistent accounts of this conversation, but 
there were also some discrepancies. Both agreed that 
Friedman told Joyce that he doubted that a claim against 
O'Connor would have merit, and Friedman admitted that 
this "probably" constituted "advice to a client." Both were 
also in accord that during the 1989 conversation Friedman 
advised Joyce that it might be tactically unwise to sue 
O'Connor. Because the Venture action appeared headed to 
trial and because O'Connor had represented Dixon in the 
underlying transaction, Friedman counseled Joyce that it 
might "be helpful to have Mr. O'Connor or some of his firm 
available [to assist in that matter] because we weren't quite 
sure what all the issues would be, and maybe[knowing] 
what went on at the beginning would be helpful." 
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The record is also clear that in 1989 Friedman expressed 
a certain amount of professional reluctance about suing 
O'Connor. Friedman recalled telling Joyce that: "I don't like 
to handle claims against lawyers, and I'm not sur e that this 
one has any real foundation, and I'm certainly not going to 
handle a claim that I don't think has a foundation." Joyce 
concedes that Friedman never told him that he would 
handle a malpractice claim against O'Connor, and that 
Friedman explained that such claims were "not within his 
area of expertise." Joyce was unequivocal, however, that 
Friedman never expressly refused to handle such a claim. 
 
There is also some disagreement between Friedman and 
Joyce as to how they ended the 1989 conversation. 
Friedman testified that they left it by concluding that "we 
don't have to make that decision [i.e., whether to sue 
O'Connor] now, we are going to forge ahead with the 
petition for certification and hopefully get the Supreme 
Court to do something about" the Appellate Division 
decision that had reinstated the Ventur e suit. Joyce's 
deposition testimony is murky, but according to the reading 
most favorable to Dixon (which we must adopt due the 
procedural posture of this case) Friedman ended the 
conversation by telling Joyce: "I don't handle[malpractice 
cases] personally, but I'll check with my fir m. Maybe they 
do, and, if not, I've got others who can."3 Friedman 
admitted that he probably billed Dixon for this 
conversation. He also conceded that he took no action with 
respect to a potential malpractice claim against O'Connor 
between 1989 and 1992, i.e., he never resear ched the legal 
issues, investigated the underlying facts, or attempted to 
find another lawyer for Dixon. 
 
Dixon's hopes that the Supreme Court of New Jersey 
would reverse the Appellate Division's decision were dashed 
on January 30, 1991, when the Supreme Court affirmed 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Joyce was unequivocal that Friedman made a statement to this effect 
in 1992. But the transcripts can also be read to say that Friedman made 
such a statement in 1989. Because this case is at the summary 
judgment stage and because it is the non-movant, Dixon is entitled to 
have all ambiguities resolved in its favor . See infra Part II. 
Accordingly, 
we will read Joyce's testimony as declaring that Friedman also made 
such a statement in 1989. 
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the Appellate Division's judgment. See Dixon V enture v. 
Joseph Dixon Crucible Co., 584 A.2d 797 (N.J. 1991). The 
Supreme Court remanded the case to the Superior Court 
for trial, see id. at 800, where Dixon was held liable to 
Venture for over $3 million, of which just under $1.5 
million were awarded as damages on the ECRA claim. 
 
Friedman and Joyce next spoke about suing O'Connor in 
the spring of 1992.4 Joyce told Friedman that "it would 
seem that we had a malpractice action against the prior 
firm, that it seemed--just looking at it, it would seem that 
we had some relief in attempting to make the company 
whole, that is it something we should consider ." Joyce 
claims that Friedman then told him that "he did not 
personally handle malpractice cases, that he was not sure 
if it was something that his firm would do, something he 
could look into, but that he also was aware of attorneys in 
and around the area who could handle it for us." Joyce 
admitted that Friedman expressed "a pr ofessional 
reluctance to ever have to do something like that to, you 
know, another attorney." 
 
After this conversation, Joyce stated that he was"under 
the impression that [Friedman] was moving forward with 
either determining whether or not his fir m would handle it 
or he would engage someone on our behalf to make us 
whole," but admitted that he had not given Friedman the 
authority to hire counsel on Dixon's behalf, and was simply 
"waiting for Mr. Friedman to get back to me to tell me how 
we were going to proceed." Friedman r ecalled the 1992 
conversation somewhat differently. He claimed to have told 
Joyce that "I really did not want to pursue a claim [against 
O'Connor], that if he wanted, he could." Friedman stated 
that he did not recall how he and Joyce had left that 
conversation, but he was clear that he did not understand 
Joyce to have told him to pursue a claim against O'Connor, 
and that he would not have done so had he been asked. 
 
On August 19, 1992, Joyce sent Friedman a letter whose 
caption stated that it was about "Dixon V enture v. Dixon 
Ticonderoga." Joyce wrote that"it would seem the following 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. We have omitted details of this conversation that are irrelevant to our 
disposition. 
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strategic moves would be in order." One such "move" was 
suing O'Connor: 
 
       As distasteful as it is for me professionally, it would 
       seem that our attorney at the time of closing should 
       have known of the ECRA requirements and, therefore, 
       a malpractice action should be initiated -- hopefully, 
       by your firm. 
 
(emphasis added). Friedman did not respond. 
 
On November 25, 1992, Joyce wrote Friedman another 
letter with the same caption. In addition to discussing the 
Venture suit, Joyce stated: 
 
       [I]t is clear to me that we were ill-advised by counsel at 
       the time of the closing as to our potential ECRA 
       responsibility. It has come to my attention, however, 
       that there may be stringent statutory time limitations 
       on advising counsel of his screw-up. Considering the 
       obvious malpractice in this case, I certainly hope we 
       are not constrained by a technicality. I'm sur e you 
       would agree that we must proceed immediately. 
 
Joyce also referred Friedman to a lawfirm that Dixon had 
used "for environmental matters." At the close of the letter, 
Joyce wrote: "I should also point out that[this] firm does 
handle malpractice (the scum) and insurance work and, if 





Having retained other counsel, Dixon commenced this 
legal malpractice action in the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey in March of 1996. The 
Complaint named six defendants: the estate of W illiam 
O'Connor;5 O'Connor's former law firm, the Schumann firm; 
Friedman; Franzblau Dratch, the law firm with which 
Friedman had been affiliated during many of the events 
underlying Dixon's claim against him; and two other law 
firms with which Friedman had been associated at various 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. O'Connor died in 1992. We will r efer to his estate as "O'Connor" 
during the remainder of this opinion. 
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times. Friedman's Answer raised cross-claims against two 
other law firms and two other attorneys, and both 
Friedman and Franzblau Dratch pled rights of 
indemnification and contribution against various other 
parties. The case was assigned to Judge William G. Bassler. 
 
Rather than answer, O'Connor and the Schumannfirm 
filed a motion pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
12(b)(6) seeking to have the claims against them dismissed 
as time-barred. Dixon did not oppose the motion, but 
Friedman and Franzblau Dratch did. The District Court 
eventually granted the motion. Further motion practice 
resulted in the uncontested dismissal of the claims against 
all defendants and third-party defendants except Friedman 
and Franzblau Dratch. During this period, the case was 
reassigned to Judge Katherine S. Hayden. 
 
Dixon, Friedman, and Franzblau Dratch eventually 
moved for summary judgment. On October 16, 1999, Judge 
Hayden rendered an oral ruling stating that she would 
grant summary judgment in favor of Friedman and 
Franzblau Dratch based on her conclusion that, as a 
matter of law, Friedman had not been negligent. Dixon filed 
a timely notice of appeal, reciting that it was appealing only 
the portion of the final order entering summary judgment 
in favor of Friedman and Franzblau Dratch. Friedman and 
Franzblau Dratch filed cross-appeals, contesting only the 
dismissal of the claims against O'Connor and the 
Schumann firm. See also Dixon's Opening Br. at 59 ("[T]his 
Court should reverse the District Court's grant of summary 
judgment in favor of Harold Friedman, Esquir e and 
Franzblau Dratch . . ., and remand this case to the District 





This is a diversity case, and, accordingly, Erie Railroad 
Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), mandates that we 
"apply the substantive law produced by . . . the highest 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
S 1332(a). We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1291. 
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court of the [relevant] state." In re Asbestos Litig., 829 F.2d 
1233, 1237 (3d Cir. 1987). Statutes of limitations are 
substantive for Erie purposes. See Guaranty Trust Co. v. 
York, 326 U.S. 99, 110 (1945). The parties agree that New 
Jersey law governs the issues of when Dixon's malpractice 
claim against O'Connor accrued and expired, and whether 
there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether 
Friedman committed malpractice. 
 
New Jersey law provides that "[i]f an attorney shall 
neglect or mismanage any cause in which he is employed, 
he shall be liable for all damages sustained by his client." 
N.J. Stat. Ann. S 2A:13-4. "A legal-malpractice action 
derives from the tort of negligence." Grunwald v. Bronkesh, 
621 A.2d 459, 463 (N.J. 1993). Accordingly, a plaintiff must 
prove the traditional elements: the existence of a duty; a 
violation of that duty; and causation of har m. See id. This 
case involves two tiers of malpractice claims: (1) Dixon's 
claims against O'Connor and the Schumann fir m, based on 
the former's failure to advise it about ECRA; and (2) Dixon's 
claim against Friedman and Franzblau Dratch, based on 
Friedman's allowing Dixon's claims against O'Connor and 
the Schumann firm to become time-barr ed. 
 
We are faced with two issues on appeal. Judge Bassler 
granted the Rule 12(b)(6) motions brought by O'Connor and 
the Schumann firm to dismiss Dixon's claims against them 
as time-barred. Friedman and Franzblau Dratch appeal 
from that ruling. Our standard of r eview is plenary, i.e., de 
novo, see Lake v. Arnold, 232 F .3d 360, 365 (3d Cir. 2000), 
and we consider this issue in Part III. The second issue 
before us is whether Judge Hayden properly granted 
summary judgment in favor of Friedman and Franzblau 
Dratch on the ground that--even assuming that an 
attorney-client relationship arose with respect to a potential 
malpractice action against O'Connor--Friedman br eached 
no professional duty that he owed to Dixon. Summary 
judgment, of course, is appropriate only when"there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the moving 
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 56(c). As the nonmoving party, Dixon is entitled to 
have any factual disputes resolved in its favor , and to the 
benefit of all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from 
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the facts. See, e.g., Gruenke v. Seip, 225 F .3d 290, 298 (3d 
Cir. 2000).7 We r eview de novo this aspect of the District 
Court's judgment, see, e.g., Watson v. Eastman Kodak Co., 





We must first consider when Dixon gained and lost the 
right to sue O'Connor. Our resolution of these questions is 
critical for two reasons. First, it will dispose of the cross- 
appeals brought by Friedman and Franzblau Dratch, which 
challenge the District Court's order dismissing the claims 
against O'Connor and the Schumann firm as time-barred. 
Second, our determination of these issues is a necessary 
predicate for resolution of Dixon's appeal of the grant of 
summary judgment in favor of Friedman and Franzblau 
Dratch. The gravamen of Dixon's claim against Friedman 
(and, consequently, against Franzblau Dratch) is that 
Friedman failed to advise it as to when the limitations 
period would run on a legal malpractice action against 
O'Connor. To assess whether ther e is a genuine dispute of 
material fact as to whether Friedman acted negligently, we 




Under New Jersey law, legal malpractice claims ar e 
subject to a six year statute of limitations. See N.J. Stat. 
Ann. S 2A:14-1; Grunwald v. Bronkesh, 621 A.2d 459, 461 
(N.J. 1993). That period begins to run when a claim 
accrues, which is governed by the "discovery rule," which 
operates "to postpone the accrual of a cause of action when 
a plaintiff does not and cannot know the facts that 
constitute an actionable claim." Grunwald, 621 A.2d at 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. Though Dixon also moved for summary judgment on its claims against 
Friedman and Franzblau Dratch, Judge Hayden denied its motion. 
Because Dixon has not appealed this aspect of the District Court's 
judgment, the only question is whether Judge Hayden properly granted 
summary judgment in favor of Friedman and Franzblau Dratch. Dixon is 
the nonmoving party for purposes of that inquiry. 
 
                                15 
 
 
463. A legal malpractice claim accrues when the client 
gains knowledge of two elements: "fault" and"injury" 
(which is synonymous with "damage"). Id.  
 
A prospective plaintiff acquires knowledge of an 
attorney's "fault" when he or she r ealizes that the lawyer 
has been negligent, and when he or she knows or should 
know that any harm arising out of a given transaction or 
matter "is attributable to the attorney's negligent advice." 
Id. at 466. The Supreme Court of New Jersey has eschewed 
laying down bright line rules for determining when this 
requirement is satisfied: A client need not suffer an adverse 
judgment before determining that his or her lawyer has 
committed malpractice, but neither does the existence of 
such a judgment necessarily establish that the client was 
thereinafter charged with such knowledge. See id. Indeed, 
depending on the circumstances, a client may gain 
knowledge of his or her attorney's fault befor e, during, or 
after the resolution of an underlying matter . See id. 
 
Damages must be "real and substantial as opposed to 
speculative" to start the running of the statute of 
limitations, id. at 465, but the Supr eme Court of New 
Jersey has broadly defined the concept of"injury." That 
Court has held that "[i]t is not necessary that all or even 
the greater part of damages have to occur befor e the cause 
of action arises." Id. (quotation marks and citations 
omitted). And though "actual damages may exist in the 
form of an adverse judgment," they may also arise, "in the 
form of attorney's fees, before a court has announced its 




To apply these precepts, we must identify three moments 
in time: the point when Dixon first had reason to believe 
that O'Connor had been negligent; the instant when it was 
first harmed by O'Connor's alleged malpractice; and the 
moment at which Dixon had reason to believe that the 
harms that it had suffered wer e caused by O'Connor's 
supposed errors. We believe that Dixon was on notice that 
O'Connor had been negligent in either late 1984 or early 
1985, when Friedman informed a Dixon r epresentative that 
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the Jersey City property's sale date had r endered the 
transaction subject to ECRA--a fact that O'Connor had 
never mentioned. 
 
It is critical to remember the nature of the malpractice 
with which Dixon charges O'Connor. This is not a case 
where O'Connor gave Dixon bad advice about ECRA; rather, 
the record shows that O'Connor never even mentioned 
ECRA or stated that it might apply to the sale of the Jersey 
City property. As a result, Dixon closed the Venture deal 
without giving any consideration to ECRA. Accor dingly, as 
soon as it learned that the transaction's closing date had 
rendered it subject to ECRA, Dixon had r eason to believe 
that O'Connor had erred by omission. 
 
We next conclude that Dixon was injur ed by O'Connor's 
alleged malpractice by October 21, 1985--the date by 
which it had incurred an obligation to pay attorneys' fees to 
Friedman's firm in connection with r esponding to Venture's 
ECRA-based demands. Venture lear ned that ECRA had 
applied to the sale of the Jersey City property in the 
summer of 1985, and soon realized that Dixon had not 
complied with the statute's clean-up requir ements. Venture 
sent Dixon letters dated July 15, 1985 and October 9, 1985 
demanding that Dixon comply with ECRA; the latter letter 
specifically noted that the sale's closing date (February 28, 
1984) had triggered ECRA duties. Dixon then r etained 
Friedman's firm to respond to V enture's demands. 
Friedman directed an associate to prepar e a response on 
behalf of Dixon, which was dated October 21, 1985. 
Friedman "assume[d]" that he billed Dixon for these 
services. 
 
By the time the October 21 letter was sent, O'Connor's 
alleged malpractice had injured Dixon. Had O'Connor done 
his job, Dixon's argument goes, the sale would never have 
been subject to ECRA at all.8 But because O'Connor did not 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. To have avoided ECRA, Dixon and V enture would apparently have had 
to do two things: (1) they would have needed to close prior to December 
31, 1983; and (2) Dixon would have needed to for ego the lease-back. 
Dixon has submitted evidence that these steps could have and would 
have been taken had the parties known about ECRA. Robert Morris, who 
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advise Dixon about ECRA prior to the closing, Dixon was 
forced to retain Friedman's firm to respond to Venture's 
demands. Even if it did not tender payment immediately, 
Dixon certainly acquired an obligation to pay Friedman's 
firm by the time the October 21, 1985 letter was mailed. 
And because Grunwald squarely held that incurrence of 
attorney fees can constitute damages for purposes of 
starting the statute of limitations, see Grunwald v. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
signed the contract of sale on behalf of Venture, certified that "ECRA's 
applicability . . . could have easily been avoided, if I had been aware of 
ECRA prior to closing." Specifically, Morris stated that he "would have 
tendered the purchase price and closed . .. prior to December 31, 1984," 
and represented that he "had the necessary financing in place to do so." 
Morris also claimed that he "would have for egone the lease-back to 
Dixon," and that he "would have done so in exchange for a reduction in 
the purchase price equal to the present value of the stream of 
anticipated profits." Morris submitted that "any reasonable businessman 
would have been able to agree to this or similar terms" and noted that 
his "contract negotiations with Dixon had gone r easonably well, and we 
were able to agree on all other material terms." Gino Pala, who served as 
Dixon's CEO during the relevant time period, testified that Dixon was 
"ready to leave [the Jersey City pr operty] at any time," and that it 
"wanted to get out as soon as possible." David Brewster, who was a 
member of Dixon's board at the time of the sale and later served as its 
CEO, certified that had he been aware "that ECRA liability could [have 
been] avoided by closing the transaction befor e ECRA's effective date, 
[he] would have insisted that the transaction close prior to December 31, 
1983." Brewster stated that he was "not aware of any reason why the 
transaction could not have closed prior to December 31, 1983." Brewster 
also represented that he would have agr eed to forego the lease-back 
entirely because "even if that resulted in a reduced purchase price . . . 
[i]t would have been worth losing a few hundr ed thousand dollars in 
order to avoid millions of dollars of ECRA liability." Friedman disputes 
these allegations, averring that the scenario of fered by Dixon is "purely 
speculative and improbable." Friedman assails the credibility of Pala and 
Brewster, contending that what they say now is self-serving and 
inconsistent with statements they made earlier . He also avers that it 
would have been against Venture's inter est to structure the transaction 
so as to avoid ECRA. Lastly, Friedman contends that even had ECRA 
been avoided, Venture would have incurr ed other environmental liability 
in connection with the sale, and would have sued Dixon to recover those 
costs. As will appear, see infra note 15, we do not resolve these issues 
here. 
 
                                18 
 
 
Bronkesh, 621 A.2d 459, 465 (N.J. 1993), we think that 
Dixon was injured by O'Connor's purported malpractice by 
that time. 
 
We acknowledge that not every claim made against a 
client--and not every counsel fee expended in defense of 
that claim--triggers the running of the statute of limitations 
for a legal malpractice claim. Accrual does not occur until 
a prospective plaintiff realizes that his or her lawyer has 
been negligent, and that he or she has been har med as a 
result of that negligence. The dispositive question, therefore, 
is when Dixon knew or should have known that any 
damages were attributable to O'Connor's negligent advice. 
See id. at 466. We conclude that Dixon had such notice by 
the time the October 21, 1985 letter was sent. By early 
1985 Dixon had reason to believe that any ECRA costs it 
acquired in connection with the Jersey City transaction 
were due to O'Connor's failure to advise it about ECRA 
prior to the closing. And by October 21, 1985, Dixon had 
suffered ECRA-related costs in connection to that sale. We 
believe that Dixon was on notice that O'Connor's alleged 
malpractice may have caused it harm by that date, and 
therefore hold that Dixon's malpractice action against 
O'Connor and the Schumann firm accrued by October 21, 





We are unpersuaded by the arguments offered by 
Friedman and Franzblau Dratch in support of a later date 
for either accrual of Dixon's claim or the running of the 




Friedman submits that the limitations period did not 
commence until at least July 21, 1989--the date that the 
Appellate Division reversed the Superior Court's decision 
and reinstated the Venture suit. 9 Friedman's argument is 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. Friedman also argues that the limitations period did not start running 
until January 30, 1991, when the Supreme Court of New Jersey affirmed 
the Appellate Division's order. For the same reasons that we reject his 
submission that Dixon's claims against O'Connor and the Schumann 
firm did not accrue until 1989, we r eject this claim as well. 
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largely based on the facts of Grunwald v. Bronkesh, 621 
A.2d 459 (N.J. 1993). 
 
The plaintiff in that case had sued an attor ney who had 
represented him in a real estate transaction. Their 
association began when a third party expr essed interest in 
acquiring an option to buy a property that the plaintiff 
owned in Atlantic City, and the plaintiff r etained the 
defendant lawyer to draw up the relevant documents. The 
lawyer prepared two items: an option agr eement and a 
contract for sale, the latter of which was to be triggered if 
the third party exercised the option. The attorney presented 
both documents to the third party, instructing it to sign the 
option agreement and initial the contract for sale. Instead, 
the third party signed both documents. 
 
The lawyer advised the plaintiff that by signing the sales 
contract, the third party had assumed an enfor ceable 
obligation to buy the property. Relying on this advice, the 
plaintiff bypassed another opportunity to develop his 
property. The third party, however , never exercised the 
option. Still acting on advice of the defendant lawyer, the 
plaintiff then sued the third party for specific performance 
of the contract for sale. A trial court rejected the plaintiff 's 
claim, holding that the third party never incurred an 
enforceable obligation to buy the property because it never 
intended to do so, and stating that the plaintif f should not 
have relied on his lawyer's advice that a binding contract 
had been created. This decision was later affirmed on 
appeal. The plaintiff then brought a legal malpractice action 
against the defendant lawyer, which the attor ney claimed 
was time-barred. 
 
The central issue in Grunwald was when the plaintiff 's 
claim against the defendant lawyer accrued: The action was 
timely if accrual did not occur until after the conclusion of 
the appellate process in the plaintiff 's suit against the third 
party, but the claim was untimely if the limitations period 
had started running at or before the time of the trial court's 
initial adverse decision. The Supreme Court of New Jersey 
held that the plaintiff 's claim was time-barred because his 
claim had accrued at the time the trial court r ejected his 
claim against the third party. See Grunwald , 621 A.2d at 
467. The Court determined that the plaintif f had been 
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injured when the third party first r efused to exercise its 
option after the plaintiff had bypassed another offer to 
develop the Atlantic City property, and that he had been 
injured again when he incurred litigation costs in his action 
against the third party. See id. And the Court held that the 
plaintiff gained knowledge that his injuries were 
attributable to his lawyer's negligence when the trial court 
held that he should not have relied on his lawyer's advice 
that a binding contract for sale had been cr eated between 
the third party and him. See id. 
 
Friedman seeks to persuade us that, under Grunwald, a 
client never gains knowledge of his or her lawyer's fault 
until a court issues an adverse decision in an underlying 
litigation. He notes that the Grunwald court held that the 
plaintiff gained knowledge of his lawyer's fault when the 
trial court issued its adverse decision and "not when the 
third party took a position contrary to the advice the 
attorney had given, nor when plaintiff brought suit against 
the third party." Drawing an analogy between Grunwald 
and this case, Friedman submits that just as the plaintiff 
in Grunwald had no reason to feel that he was the victim 
of malpractice merely because the third party disagreed 
with his lawyer's interpretation of the thir d party's signing 
the contract for sale, Dixon had no reason to feel aggrieved 
by O'Connor's actions simply because Ventur e sought to 
impose "a novel legal liability upon Dixon--one not 
specifically set forth in the ECRA statute, and one which 
had not been the subject of any prior judicial 
determination." And, Friedman opines, because there was 
no adverse decision against Dixon in the underlying 
litigation until the Appellate Division reinstated Venture's 
ECRA suit on July 21, 1989, Dixon had no reason to 
believe that O'Connor had committed malpractice prior to 
that date. 
 
We disagree. The bright-line rule Friedman seeks is 
inconsistent with Grunwald's clear statement that 
"knowledge of fault may occur before  . . . a judicial 
resolution of the underlying action." 621 A.2d at 466. The 
ultimate, case-specific question is "when a plaintiff knows 
or should know that the damage is attributable to the 
attorney's negligent advice." Id. And though the plaintiff in 
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Grunwald had no reason to believe that his attorney had 
committed malpractice until the first adverse decision in 
the underlying matter, the facts here ar e significantly 
different. The Grunwald opinion contains no evidence that 
anyone (other than, perhaps, the lawyer for the third party) 
told Grunwald that his lawyer may have render ed incorrect 
advice until the trial court did so in rejecting the plaintiff 's 
claim against the third party. Here, in contrast, Friedman 
informed Dixon that ECRA had applied to the sale in either 
late 1984 or early 1985--long before thefirst adverse 
decision. This is not a case where O'Connor gave Dixon 
incorrect counsel about ECRA; indeed, if it was there would 
be a strong argument that Dixon would not have gained 
knowledge of O'Connor's fault until a judicial ruling 
repudiated his advice. Instead, the evidence shows that 
O'Connor failed even to mention ECRA to Dixon prior to the 
closing. Under these circumstances, Dixon should have 
realized that O'Connor had made a mistake as soon as it 




Franzblau Dratch presses a more elaborate argument. It 
first suggests that Dixon's claim against O'Connor accrued 
on May 27, 1986--the day Venture filed suit against Dixon 
seeking recovery for its clean-up costs. If true, then the 
limitations period would ordinarily have expir ed six years 
later on May 27, 1992. But Franzblau Dratch also contends 
that the limitations period was tolled for the 518 days 
between February 18, 1988, when the Superior Court threw 
out the Venture suit, and July 21, 1989, when the 
Appellate Division reinstated it. We will refer to this as the 
"tolling argument." If correct, then Dixon's time to sue 
O'Connor did not expire until October 27, 1993. Franzblau 
Dratch notes that Friedman severed his ties with it during 
the spring of 1993, and submits that it cannot be held 
liable because Friedman left the firm prior to the time that 
Dixon lost the right to sue O'Connor.10 We reject this 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. Friedman and Franzblau Dratch disagree about whether Friedman 
left the firm on May 28, 1993 or June 1, 1993, but that dispute is 
ultimately irrelevant. 
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argument because: (1) we disagree with Franzblau Dratch 
as to when Dixon's claim against O'Connor accrued; (2) we 
disagree that the elements of "fault" and"damage" were not 
present between the time the Superior Court dismissed the 
Venture suit and the time the Appellate Division reinstated 
it, and, therefore, that Dixon could not have sued O'Connor 
during that period; and (3) we disagree that New Jersey law 
permits tolling in circumstances such as this one. 
 
The foundation of Franzblau Dratch's tolling ar gument is 
its premise that Dixon's claim against O'Connor did not 
accrue until Venture sued Dixon. But if we are correct that 
the claim against O'Connor actually accrued by October 21, 
1985, then the tolling argument fails on its own terms. If 
the statute started to run on October 21, 1985, then it 
ordinarily would have expired on October 21, 1991. Even if 
we were to add 518 days to that date, we would conclude 
that the limitations period ran on March 22, 1993--before 
Friedman severed his ties with Franzblau Dratch. See supra 
note 10. Franzblau Dratch's tolling argument thus makes 
no difference unless Dixon's claim accrued on May 27, 
1986. 
 
Franzblau Dratch's only argument in favor of May 27, 
1986 as the accrual date is its suggestion that this is the 
day "found" by Judge Bassler. This ar gument suffers from 
two problems. First, because Judge Bassler was acting on 
a motion brought pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 12(b)(6), he made no factualfindings. At all 
events, our standard of review is plenary. See Lake v. 
Arnold, 232 F.3d 360, 365 (3d Cir . 2000). Second, we 
disagree with Franzblau Dratch's interpr etation of Judge 
Bassler's opinion. Judge Bassler wrote that Dixon "clearly 
had knowledge of a claim for damages [against O'Connor] in 
either 1985 or at the latest, 1986." Judge Bassler also 
noted that Dixon conceded that it had such knowledge by 
1986, and ultimately determined that Dixon"clearly 
received notice of [Venture's claim against it] by May 1986." 
(emphasis added). Because this suit was not filed until 
1996, Judge Bassler's determination that Dixon's claim 
against O'Connor accrued in 1986 was sufficient to decide 
the issue before him: whether the six-year statute of 
limitations had run for purposes of a legal malpractice 
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action brought by Dixon against O'Connor's estate and the 
Schumann firm. There was simply no r eason for Judge 
Bassler to decide whether the claim accrued at an earlier 
date, and we believe that his opinion makes clear that he 
did not. We therefore adher e to our conclusion that Dixon's 
claim accrued by October 21, 1985. See supra Part III(B). 
 
Moreover, we disagree with Franzblau Dratch's 
contention that the statute of limitations was ever tolled in 
this case. The firm asserts that the running of the statute 
was tolled because the elements of "fault" and"damage" 
necessary for the accrual of a legal malpractice claim were 
not present between the time the Superior Court dismissed 
the Venture suit and the time the Appellate Division 
reinstated it. During that period, Franzblau Dratch avers, 
Dixon had no reason to believe that O'Connor had been at 
fault or that any negligence on his part had caused it to 
suffer any damages. 
 
We reject this "fault" argument for the same reason that 
we rejected Friedman's: It rests on a mistaken view of what 
O'Connor is alleged to have done wrong. Franzblau Dratch 
assumes that the Superior Court's initial decision to 
dismiss the Venture suit vindicated O'Connor's actions. 
Although this might be correct had O'Connor advised Dixon 
that ECRA did not create a private right of action for 
damages, that is not what O'Connor did. Instead, Dixon 
charges that O'Connor committed malpractice by failing to 
mention ECRA at all. The Superior Court's initial decision 
that Venture could not recover ECRA-imposed clean-up 
costs from Dixon may have limited the damage done by 
O'Connor's alleged dereliction, but it did nothing to change 
the fact that O'Connor had erred. 
 
We also disagree with Franzblau Dratch's claim that 
Dixon had sustained no actionable damages between the 
time the Superior Court dismissed the Ventur e suit and the 
time the Appellate Division reinstated it. Dixon incurred 
counsel fees in responding to Ventur e's pre-suit demands 
and in defending the suit prior to the dismissal. Though 
Franzblau Dratch rightly points out that the incurring of 
counsel fees counts as injury for legal malpractice purposes 
only if the client has reason to attribute those fees to his or 
her lawyer's negligence, we conclude that that pr ecept is 
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satisfied here. Dixon's claim is that O'Connor failed to 
advise it about ECRA, and that this failure pr evented Dixon 
and Venture from structuring their transaction to avoid the 
statute. Under this scenario, if O'Connor had not been 
negligent, then ECRA would not have applied to the sale. As 
a result, any counsel fees Dixon incurr ed responding to 
Venture's demands after it became appar ent that ECRA had 
applied to the sale were attributable to O'Connor's 
negligence. Though the Superior Court's dismissal of the 
Venture suit may have lessened the extent to which Dixon 
was harmed, it did not change the fact that Dixon was 
forced to spend money defending an ECRA suit that might 
have been avoided entirely had O'Connor not (allegedly) 
committed malpractice. This is enough under New Jersey 
law. See Grunwald v. Bronkesh, 621 A.2d 459, 465 (N.J. 
1993) (holding that for a legal malpractice claim to accrue, 
a plaintiff need not know the precise extent of his or her 
damages, or even have suffered all of the damages 
attributable to his or her attorney's negligence). 
 
Finally, Franzblau Dratch's tolling argument is 
fundamentally inconsistent with the policies beyond New 
Jersey's statute of limitations as expressed in Grunwald, 
and it is unsupported by any relevant case law. The 
principal consideration underlying New Jersey's statute of 
limitations is fairness to defendants. See id. The Supreme 
Court of New Jersey has observed that allowing the 
limitations period on a legal malpractice claim to be 
postponed until the appellate process in an underlying 
litigation was complete could leave a lawyer unsur e 
whether he or she will be sued for an extraor dinarily long 
period of time. See id. In addition to denying peace of mind 
to lawyers, long delays would also result in trials being 
conducted after memories have faded and evidence has 
been lost. See id. Precisely the same could occur under 
Franzblau Dratch's proposed approach wher e the statute 
would be tolled, as a matter of law, during any period 
where the prospective plaintiff appears to have obtained a 
victory in an underlying litigation.1 1 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. Indeed, the facts of this case provide an apt illustration. Dixon 
charges that O'Connor committed malpractice in 1983-84, but this suit 
was not filed until over a decade later. O'Connor died in 1992, and 
counsel for the Schumann firm informed us at oral argument that many 
of his records have been destroyed. 
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Franzblau Dratch has pointed to no relevant cases that 
allowed tolling in a situation such as this one. The only 
New Jersey cases it cites are inapposite, because the 
defendants in those cases had received notice of the claims 
against them within the limitations period. See Galligan v. 
Westfield Ctr. Serv., Inc., 412 A.2d 122, 123 (N.J. 1980) 
(defendant received notice when the plaintif f brought an 
action in federal court); Peloso v. Hartfor d Fire Ins. Co., 267 
A.2d 498, 499-500 (N.J. 1970) (defendant insurance 
company had received notice when the plaintif f submitted 
its request for benefits); Mitzner v. W . Ridgelawn Cemetery, 
Inc., 709 A.2d 825, 826 (N.J. App. Div. 1998) (defendant 
received notice when the plaintiff br ought an action in New 
York state court, which was ultimately dismissed due to 
lack of personal jurisdiction). 
 
The principal reason for statutes of limitations is to 
provide notice to defendants, see Grunwald , 621 A.2d at 
465, and tolling the statute in cases where the defendant 
has nevertheless received notice does not under mine this 
policy. Critically different here is that there is no evidence 
that O'Connor ever received notice that Dixon may sue him 
at any time during the limitations period. The only case 
Franzblau Dratch references that allowed tolling in a 
situation such as this one is Pope County v. Friday, 
Eldredge & Clark, 852 S.W.2d 114 (Ark. 1993). In addition 
to not being a New Jersey case, Pope County's holding is 
based on a premise that the Supreme Court of New Jersey 
rejected in Grunwald: that a putative plaintiff has no legal 
malpractice claim until an underlying adverse decision is 
affirmed on appeal because his or her damages are 
speculative until that point. See Pope County , 852 S.W.2d 
at 115 (summarizing the court's prior holding in Stroud v. 
Ryan, 763 S.W.2d 76 (Ark. 1989)). For all of these reasons, 




We conclude that Dixon's malpractice claim against 
O'Connor accrued no later than October 21, 1985 and that 
it expired no later than October 25, 1991. W e therefore hold 
that the District Court did not err in granting the motions 
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by O'Connor and the Schumann firm to dismiss the claims 




Having determined when Dixon's malpractice claim 
against O'Connor became time-barred, we tur n to whether 
there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether 
Friedman committed malpractice. This inquiry 
encompasses two issues: (1) Is there a genuine dispute of 
fact as to whether an attorney-client r elationship arose 
between Friedman and Dixon concerning a potential 
malpractice claim against O'Connor?; and, if so, (2) Is there 
a genuine dispute as to whether Friedman breached any 
professional duty that arose out of that r epresentation?12 
Because we conclude that there are genuinely disputed 
facts going to both issues, we will reverse the District 
Court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Friedman 




The threshold question is whether Friedman cr eated an 
attorney-client relationship with Dixon with respect to a 
potential malpractice action against O'Connor in 1989.13 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
12. The parties have not directed to our attention to any New Jersey case 
expressly holding that the first of these questions is a jury issue, but 
we 
will assume that it is because counsel for both Dixon and Friedman 
agreed on this point at oral argument. 
13. As we noted supra at Part I(A), Friedman and Joyce also discussed 
the possibility of suing O'Connor in the spring of 1992. At that time, 
Friedman advised Joyce that it was "clear" that there was no statute of 
limitations problem. This advice was based on the Appellate Division's 
decision in Grunwald v. Bronkesh, 604 A.2d 126 (N.J. App. Div. 1992) 
("Grunwald I"), which was ultimately overruled by Grunwald v. Bronkesh, 
621 A.2d 459 (N.J. 1993) ("Grunwald II"). The District Court granted 
summary judgment against Dixon in part because it concluded that it 
had been reasonable for Friedman to rely upon Grunwald I at the time 
of the 1992 conversation. Although Dixon assails this ruling by the 
District Court, contending that New Jersey law gover ning the accrual of 
a legal malpractice claim was anything but clear in 1992, we need not 
resolve this dispute. Because we have deter mined that the statute of 
limitations ran on any claim against O'Connor by the fall of 1991, 
anything that Friedman said about such a suit in 1992 is immaterial. 
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According to the Restatement of the Law Gover ning 
Lawyers S 26 (Proposed Final Draft No. 1 1996)--which was 
quoted with approval in Herbert v. Haytaian , 678 A.2d 
1183, 1188 (N.J. App. Div. 1996), and which both parties 
agree accurately states New Jersey law--an attorney-client 
relationship is created with respect to a particular matter 
when: 
 
       1) a person manifests to a lawyer the person's intent 
       that the lawyer provide legal services to the person; 
       and either 
 
       (a) the lawyer manifests to the person consent to do so; 
       or 
 
       (b) the lawyer fails to manifest lack of consent to do so, 
       and the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that 
       the person reasonably relies on the lawyer to provide 
       the services. 
 
Because there is a genuine issue of material fact as to 
whether an attorney-client relationship was created 
pursuant to S 26(1)(b), we do not addr ess S 26(1)(a). 
 
The first question is whether Joyce manifested an intent 
that Friedman provide legal services. Friedman has never 
seriously disputed the existence of this factor , and with 
good reason. Joyce (on behalf of Dixon) clearly manifested 
such an intent when, in 1989, he sought Friedman's advice 
about the possibility of suing O'Connor for malpractice. 
 
Friedman rests primarily on the assertion that he 
"manifest[ed] lack of consent to" advise Dixon, but that 
argument does not carry the day. Accor ding to Friedman's 
deposition, the strongest statement he made in 1989 was: 
"I don't like to handle claims against lawyers, and I'm not 
sure that this one has any real foundation, and I'm 
certainly not going to handle a claim that I don't think has 
a foundation." This statement could be interpr eted in at 
least two ways: Either Friedman was simply infor ming 
Joyce that he would not pursue a malpractice action 
against O'Connor unless he concluded that it had merit, or 
he was refusing to advise Dixon at all. The pr ocedural 
posture of this case mandates that we r esolve ambiguities 
in favor of Dixon, and, as a result, we do not read this 
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statement as an affirmative refusal by Friedman. Therefore, 
we cannot say that there is no genuine issue of material 
fact with respect to this factor. 
 
The final issue in determining whether an attorney-client 
relationship arose between Dixon and Friedman with 
respect to a malpractice action against O'Connor is whether 
Dixon reasonably relied on Friedman to pr ovide such 
services and whether Friedman knew or should have 
known that it was doing so. Though the question is close, 
three things convince us that there is a genuine dispute of 
material fact as to this issue. 
 
First, at the time of the 1989 conversation, Friedman was 
also representing Dixon in the Venture litigation. The 
Venture suit and the potential malpractice action against 
O'Connor arose out of the same set of historical events: 
Dixon's sale of the Jersey City property to V enture. The fact 
that Dixon was already relying on Friedman for advice and 
representation in a closely related matter supports an 
inference that Dixon expected Friedman to advise it about 
a potential malpractice action against O'Connor and that 
Friedman knew or should have known that fact. 
 
Second, despite his purported reluctance to do so, 
Friedman admitted that he gave Dixon legal advice about 
suing O'Connor during the 1989 conversation. Friedman 
originally claimed that his 1989 conversation with Joyce 
was not actually about bringing an action against 
O'Connor, but rather was concerned with determining 
whether Friedman was willing to undertake such a 
representation. But when directly asked whether his 
statement to Joyce that he doubted that any claim against 
O'Connor would have merit constituted "advice to a client," 
Friedman admitted that it "probably" did. The fact that 
Friedman gave such advice on one occasion could support 
an inference that Dixon reasonably expected him to do so 
in the future, and that Friedman knew or should have 
known that Dixon would so rely. 
 
Finally, though the depositions are unclear as to how 
Joyce and Friedman left their 1989 conversation, we believe 
that the reasonable reading most favorable to Dixon 
supports an inference that Dixon expected Friedman to get 
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back to it about a potential malpractice claim against 
O'Connor and that Friedman knew or should have known 
of that expectation. According to Friedman, he told Joyce 
that there was no need to decide whether to sue O'Connor 
at that time because they were going to attempt to convince 
the Supreme Court of New Jersey to throw out the Venture 
suit. This statement, particularly in light of the parties' on- 
going relationship, might reasonably be understood as a 
promise by Friedman to revisit the matter with Joyce once 
the underlying appeal was complete. 
 
This conclusion is also supported by Joyce's deposition. 
Reading his deposition most favorably to Dixon, see supra 
note 3 and accompanying text, Joyce recalled that 
Friedman told him he did not "handle" malpractice actions 
"personally" but that he would "check with[his] firm" to see 
if another lawyer would, and, if not, he would find another 
lawyer for Dixon. This testimony supports an infer ence 
that, at the very least, Dixon was relying on Friedman to 
find a lawyer to "handle" the malpractice action against 
O'Connor, and that Friedman knew or should have known 
that it was doing so. 
 
Cutting most strongly against the conclusion that Dixon 
was relying on Friedman to advise it about a malpractice 
action against O'Connor are the letters Joyce wrote to 
Friedman in 1992. In the August 19, 1992 letter Joyce 
wrote that "[a]s distastefully as it is for me professionally, 
it would seem that our attorney at the time of closing [i.e., 
O'Connor] should have know of the ECRA requirements 
and, therefore, a malpractice action should be initiated -- 
hopefully by your firm . . . ." Joyce got no response to this 
letter, and wrote Friedman another dated November 25, 
1992. At the end of this second letter, Joyce informed 
Friedman that he had been speaking with another lawyer 
about the Venture litigation, pr ovided Friedman with that 
lawyer's phone number, and stated that "his firm does a lot 
of malpractice (the scum) and insurance work and, if your 
firm does not, please feel free to discuss these issues also." 
 
These letters could be understood as indicating that 
Dixon was not relying on Friedman to advise it about a 
malpractice suit against O'Connor because they imply that 
Joyce himself did not believe that Friedman had agr eed to 
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advise Dixon in such a suit. This is not the only r eading of 
the evidence, however. First, as pointed out by Dixon at 
oral argument, the fact that Friedman may have 
communicated to Dixon that he would not personally 
litigate a malpractice action against O'Connor would not 
preclude a finding that he agreed to advise Dixon about 
one, and an agreement to give advice is all that is necessary 
to establish an attorney-client relationship. Second, to the 
extent the letters shed light on Dixon's state of mind, they 
do so primarily in terms of what Joyce was thinking in 
1992. The question before us, however, is not whether 
Dixon was relying on Friedman to provide legal advice in 
1992. Rather, it is whether Dixon was so r elying between 
1989 (when the first conversation between Joyce and 
Friedman occurred) and the fall of 1991 (when the statute 
of limitations ran on any claim against O'Connor). The 
relevant time period ended in the fall of 1991, but Joyce's 
letters were not sent until the summer of 1992. In the 
interim, Joyce and Friedman had at least one additional 
conversation about suing O'Connor, and that conversation 
may have changed Joyce's understanding of the state of 
affairs between Friedman and Dixon. Because of this, the 
letters are not dispostive as to Joyce's (and thus Dixon's) 
understanding of the situation between 1989 and 1991. 
 
We therefore hold that ther e is a genuine issue of 
material fact as to whether Friedman created an attorney- 
client relationship between himself and Dixon in 1989 with 




The final issue before us--assuming an attorney-client 
relationship existed--is whether ther e is a genuine dispute 
as to whether Friedman breached a professional duty that 
he owed to Dixon. "[L]awyers owe a duty to their clients to 
provide their services with reasonable knowledge, skill, and 
diligence." Ziegelheim v. Apollo, 607 A.2d 1298, 1303 (N.J. 
1992). But because " `[w]hat constitutes a reasonable degree 
of care is not to be considered in a vacuum but with 
reference to the type of service the attor ney undertakes to 
perform,' " the Supreme Court of New Jersey has 
formulated the standard of care"in rather broad terms." Id. 
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(quoting St. Pius X House of Retreats v. Diocese of Camden, 
443 A.2d 1052 (N.J. 1982)); see also Conklin v. Hannoch 
Weisman, 678 A.2d 1060, 1069 (N.J. 1996) ("Malpractice in 
furnishing legal advice is a function of the specific situation 
and the known predilections of the client."). 
 
Some general precepts are nevertheless clear. A lawyer 
"must take `any steps necessary in the pr oper handling of 
[a] case,' " and these steps "include, among other things, a 
careful investigation of the facts of the matter, the 
formulation of a legal strategy, the filing of appropriate 
papers, and the maintenance of communication with the 
client." Ziegelheim, 607 A.2d at 1303 (quoting Passanante v. 
Yormark, 350 A.2d 497 (N.J. App. Div. 1975)). A lawyer is 
also "obligated to keep the client informed of the status of 
the matter for which the lawyer has been retained, and is 
required to advise the client on the various legal and 




The District Court granted summary judgment against 
Dixon partly because it read the recor d as saying that 
during the 1989 conversation Friedman told Joyce that 
Dixon need not decide whether to sue O'Connor at that 
time "because there was no imminent statute of limitations 
problem." Even if Dixon was ultimately corr ect that its 
claim against O'Connor accrued in the fall of 1985 and 
expired in the fall of 1991 (and we have deter mined that it 
was), the District Court stressed that Dixon still had over 
two years to sue O'Connor at the time of the 1989 
conversation, which occurred during the summer of that 
year. Accordingly, to the extent that Friedman counseled 
Dixon that there was no "imminent" statute of limitations 
problem in the summer of 1989, his advice was sound. And 
because the advice was correct when given, the District 
Court reasoned that it was non-actionable "due to the legal 
principle that [a] plaintiff suf fers no damage as a result of 
receiving correct advice." 
 
To the extent that the District Court concluded that 
Friedman's actions in 1989 alone would not support 
malpractice liability, we have no quarrel with its analysis. 
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Disagreeing, Dixon infers from the court's holding that it 
relied on the "judgmental immunity defense" recognized in 
Procanik v. Cillo, 543 A.2d 985 (N.J. App. Div. 1988). 
Acknowledging that law is not always static and 
predictable, Procanik shields fr om malpractice liability 
lawyers who offer a "reasoned pr ofessional evaluation" 
based on the "exercise of an informed judgment"--even if 
their advice later turns out to have been incorrect. Id. at 
994. Because Friedman admits that he did no r esearch 
regarding the statute of limitations in 1989, Dixon contends 
that Friedman is ineligible for this defense. Though Dixon's 
argument on this point is sound, it is also irrelevant. What 
it misses is that "advice" that the District Court understood 
Friedman as having given Dixon in 1989, i.e., that there 
was no "imminent" statute of limitations pr oblem, was 
accurate. And, like the District Court, we fail to see how 





Dixon's primary contention, however, is not that 
Friedman committed malpractice by giving it incorr ect 
advice in 1989. Instead, it submits that Friedman br eached 
his professional duties by doing nothing whatsoever 
between the 1989 conversation and when the statute of 
limitations ran on any claim against O'Connor in 1991. 
Specifically, Dixon alleges that Friedman committed 
malpractice by: (1) advising Dixon in 1989 to delayfiling a 
claim against O'Connor; (2) assuring Dixon that he would 
revisit the issue again; (3) neglecting to r esearch when the 
limitations period would run; and (4) failing to r evisit the 
issue or to advise Dixon further about a claim against 
O'Connor until after the statute of limitations ran in 1991. 
 
When the evidence is read in the light most favorable to 
Dixon, we believe that there is a genuine issue of material 
fact as to whether Friedman committed malpractice. W e 
have already determined that ther e is a genuine issue as to 
whether Friedman created an attorney-client relationship 
between himself and Dixon with regard to a potential 
malpractice action against O'Connor. If such a relationship 
arose, Friedman assumed a duty to take any steps 
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necessary for the proper handling of the matter , to 
communicate about the matter with Dixon, and to advise it 
about the legal and strategic issues involved in the 
representation. See Ziegelheim v. Apollo, 607 A.2d 1298, 
1303 (N.J. 1992). Substantial New Jersey case law supports 
the proposition that a lawyer has a specific duty to 
research, monitor, and advise his or her clients about 
statutes of limitations. See Sommers v. McKinney , 670 A.2d 
99, 104 (N.J. App. Div. 1996) (observing that "[i]n rare 
cases, expert testimony is not required in a legal 
malpractice action where the duty of car e to a client is so 
basic that it may be determined by the court as a matter of 
law" and referencing the example of a lawyer who fails to 
file suit before the running of the statute of limitations); 
Brizak v. Needle, 571 A.2d 975, 982-83 (N.J. App. Div. 
1990) (finding the evidence sufficient to support a jury's 
finding of malpractice in a case where a lawyer failed to 
advise a client about the statute of limitations based on his 
mistaken view of when the claim accrued); Fuschetti v. 
Bierman, 319 A.2d 781, 784 (N.J. Law Div. 1974) ("The 
failure of an attorney to commence an action within the 
time of the statute would ordinarily be considered 
neglect."). 
 
In Brizak, the Appellate Division held that there was 
enough evidence to support a jury's verdict in favor of the 
plaintiff in a legal malpractice action. See 571 A.2d at 982- 
85. The plaintiff had retained the defendant lawyer to 
represent her in a medical malpractice action. The lawyer 
never counseled the plaintiff about the statute of limitations 
because of his erroneous belief that a medical malpractice 
claim does not accrue until a plaintiff secur es an opinion 
by another doctor that the doctor he or she wishes to sue 
was negligent. See id. at 980, 982. This evidence, the 
Appellate Division held, was sufficient to support the jury's 
finding that the defendant lawyer had been negligent. After 
surveying applicable New Jersey case law, see id. at 981- 
82, the court determined that, based on "the state of the 
law when defendant made his judgment[,] ther e was no 
reasonable basis for his belief " as to when the plaintiff 's 
medical malpractice claim would accrue. Id. at 982. 
Moreover, the court indicated that it would have sustained 
the jury's verdict even had the defendant's mistaken belief 
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been reasonable because the defendant had failed "to warn 
plaintiff that her claim could be time-barr ed sooner in the 
event his belief [as to when her medical malpractice claim 
would accrue] was wrong." Id. 
 
In light of both the general standards laid down by the 
Supreme Court of New Jersey and the specific precedent of 
Brizak, we hold that there is a genuine dispute of fact as to 
whether Friedman was negligent.14 The record establishes 
that Friedman did nothing with regar d to a claim by Dixon 
against O'Connor at any time between the initial 
conversation in the summer of 1989 and when the statute 
of limitations expired in the fall of 1991. Friedman never 
revisited the issue with Dixon during that time, he did no 
research to determine when the statute of limitations might 
expire, he did not file suit on Dixon's behalf, and he made 
no effort to secure another attor ney for Dixon. Under these 
circumstances, we think there is a genuine issue of 
material fact as to whether Friedman exercised reasonable 
and ordinary care and diligence. 
 
One might argue that Friedman did not br each a 
professional duty because, at most, he agr eed only to find 
a lawyer to handle Dixon's malpractice claim--not to 
research, monitor, and advise Dixon about the statute of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
14. Brizak can be read as indicating that some attorneys who fail to 
advise or misadvise their clients about statutes of limitations are liable 
for malpractice as a matter of law. Such a rule might be viable in two 
sorts of cases: (1) where a lawyer never mentions the statute of 
limitations or the risks inherent in late-filing prior to the time the 
underlying claim expires; or (2) where a lawyer falsely describes muddy 
legal waters as clear. Indeed, Brizak suggests that liability may attach 
if 
a filing deadline is missed because a lawyer failed to counsel a client 
that the lawyer's opinion as to the status of the governing standards is 
vulnerable and might turn out to be wr ong in light of lurking problems 
with respect to the stability of precedents that inform the lawyer's 
opinion. In this case, however, we have no occasion to predict whether 
the Supreme Court of New Jersey would so hold. As we noted previously, 
Dixon has not appealed the District Court's denial of its motion for 
summary judgment; it has appealed only the grant of summary 
judgment in favor of Friedman and Franzblau Dratch. The only question 
before us, therefore, is whether the record would support a finding that 
Friedman committed malpractice--not whether it compels one. 
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limitations. We conclude, however, that this argument is 
not sufficient to compel summary judgment in Friedman's 
favor. First, there is no evidence that Friedman took any 
action with respect to getting Dixon another attorney 
between 1989 and 1991. Even if he assumed an obligation 
only to do that one thing, Friedman was obligated to do 
what he promised and there is no evidence that he did. 
 
Additionally--assuming that an attorney-client 
relationship was created--we disagr ee that Friedman was 
obligated to do nothing more than find Dixon another 
lawyer. This argument conflates two different inquiries: (1) 
whether an attorney-client relationship was created 
between Friedman and Dixon with respect to a malpractice 
action against O'Connor; and, assuming it was (2) whether 
Friedman breached a professional duty. As we have 
explained above, the evidence suggesting that Friedman 
promised to look into getting another lawyer to handle the 
matter is probative as to whether Friedman cr eated an 
attorney-client relationship with r espect to the O'Connor 
matter. Assuming that such a relationship was created, 
however, we do not believe that Friedman is entitled to 
summary judgment on the grounds that that is all he 
agreed to do. Once an attorney-client r elationship is created 
with respect to a given matter, New Jersey's Rules of 
Professional Conduct states that a lawyer may only "limit 
the objectives of representation" if"the client consents after 
consultation." New Jersey Rules of Professional Conduct, 
Rule 1.2; see also Baxt v. Liloia, 714 A.2d 271, 275 (N.J. 
1998) (Rules of Professional Conduct ar e relevant to, 
though not dispositive of, the question whether a lawyer 
committed malpractice). We do not believe that the evidence 
establishes as a matter of law that Friedman expressly 
informed Dixon that he would do no mor e than see if he 
could find it another attorney, much less that Dixon ever 
consented to this limitation. 
 
We therefore conclude that if Friedman created an 
attorney-client relationship with r espect to a malpractice 
claim against O'Connor (an issue on which we have already 
concluded that there is a genuine issue of material fact), 
there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether he 
breached the professional duties such r epresentation 
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imposed. We will therefore r everse the District Court's order 





The Judgment in Nos. 99-6055 and 99-6056, dismissing 
the claims against O'Connor's estate and the Schumann 
firm, will be affirmed. The Judgment in No. 99-6054, 
granting summary judgment in favor of Friedman and 
Franzblau Dratch, will be reversed and the case remanded 
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Parties 
to bear their own costs. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
15. On appeal, Friedman and Franzblau Dratch pr offer another basis for 
affirming the judgment in their favor . Dixon's action against Friedman is 
based on its contention that he caused it to lose its malpractice claim 
against O'Connor. But even if Friedman was negligent, his dereliction 
caused no harm to Dixon unless it had a valid claim against O'Connor. 
Friedman and Franzblau Dratch argue that Dixon and Venture would 
not have been able to avoid ECRA even had O'Connor advised Dixon 
about it. If this is true then any negligence by O'Connor caused no harm 
to Dixon, and Dixon had no valid malpractice claim against Friedman. 
This is a straightforward example of the case-within-a-case phenomenon 
that often arises in professional malpractice litigation. 
 
Dixon offered evidence in response to Friedman and Franzblau 
Dratch's charges. See supra note 8. Although the District Court 
described this issue as being "problematic" for Dixon, the court never 
resolved it. We could certainly consider this argument given our plenary 
standard of review, see, e.g., Hudson United Bank v. LiTenda Mortgage 
Corp., 142 F.3d 151, 159 (3d Cir. 1998), but we decline to do so. 
Determining whether there is a genuine dispute of fact over whether 
Dixon and Venture could have avoided ECRA had O'Connor told Dixon 
about it will require a highly fact-intensive, and ultimately 
counterfactual inquiry (because O'Connor did not, in fact, ever tell Dixon 
about ECRA). We therefore believe that the sounder course of action is 
to give the parties an opportunity to focus on this complicated issue 
during a further round of briefing and to allow the District Court to rule 
on it in the first instance. 
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